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John Stewart Bell’s famous 1964 theorem is widely regarded as one of the most important devel-
opments in the foundations of physics. It has even been described as “the most profound discovery
of science.” Yet even as we approach the 50th anniversary of Bell’s discovery, its meaning and impli-
cations remain controversial. Many textbooks and commentators report that Bell’s theorem refutes
the possibility (suggested especially by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in 1935) of supplementing or-
dinary quantum theory with additional (“hidden”) variables that might restore determinism and/or
some notion of an observer-independent reality. On this view, Bell’s theorem supports the orthodox
Copenhagen interpretation. Bell’s own view of his theorem, however, was quite different. He in-
stead took the theorem as establishing an “essential conflict” between the now well-tested empirical
predictions of quantum theory and relativistic local causality. The goal of the present paper is,
in general, to make Bell’s own views more widely known and, in particular, to explain in detail
Bell’s little-known mathematical formulation of the concept of relativistic local causality on which
his theorem rests. We thus collect and organize many of Bell’s crucial statements on these topics,
which are scattered throughout his writings, into a self-contained, pedagogical discussion including
elaborations of the concepts “beable”, “completeness”, and “causality” which figure in the formula-
tion. We also show how local causality (as formulated by Bell) can be used to derive an empirically
testable Bell-type inequality, and how it can be used to recapitulate the EPR argument.
I. INTRODUCTION
In its most generalized sense, “local causality” is
the idea that physical influences propagate continuously
through space – i.e., the idea that what Einstein famously
called “spooky actions at a distance” are impossible.1 In
addition to originating this catchy slogan, Einstein was
also chiefly responsible for the modern, specifically rela-
tivistic sense of local causality, according to which causal
influences should not only propagate continuously (never
hopping across a gap in which no trace is left) but should
do so always at the speed of light or slower. The elab-
oration and precise formulation of this idea will be our
central concern here.
It is interesting to first note, though, that the pre-
relativistic “no action at a distance” sense of local causal-
ity has played an important role in the construction
and assessment of theories throughout the history of
physics.2,3 For example, some important objections to
Isaac Newton’s theory of gravitation centered on the the-
ory’s alleged positing of such non-local action at a dis-
tance. Newton’s own view, interestingly, seems to have
been that although his theory did claim that (for ex-
ample) the sun exerted causal influences on the distant
planets, this was in principle perfectly consistent with
local causality, which he strongly endorsed:
“It is inconceivable that inanimate brute mat-
ter should, without the mediation of some-
thing else which is not material, operate upon
and affect other matter without mutual con-
tact... That gravity should be innate, inher-
ent, and essential to matter, so that one body
may act upon another at a distance through
a vacuum, without the mediation of anything
else, by and through which their action and
force may be conveyed from one to another, is
to me so great an absurdity that I believe no
man who has in philosophical matters a com-
petent faculty of thinking can ever fall into
it.”4
Newton’s idea5 was evidently that his gravitational the-
ory simply didn’t yet provide a complete description of
the underlying (and presumably local) mechanism “by
and through which [massive bodies’] action and force may
be conveyed from one to another.”
Such debates had a philosophical character, though,
since at the time nothing was definitely, unambiguously
excluded by the requirement of locality. Any apparent
action at a distance in a theory could be rendered com-
patible in principle with local causality by following New-
ton and simply denying that the theory in question pro-
vided a complete description of the relevant phenomena.
This changed in 1905 with Albert Einstein’s discov-
ery of Special Relativity (SR), which for the first time
purported to identify a certain class of causal influences
– namely, those which propagate faster than light – as
definitely inconsistent with local causality. As Einstein
explained,
“The success of the Faraday-Maxwell inter-
pretation of electromagnetic action at a dis-
tance resulted in physicists becoming con-
vinced that there are no such things as in-
stantaneous action at a distance (not involv-
ing an intermediary medium) of the type of
Newton’s law of gravitation. According to the
theory of relativity, action at a distance with
the velocity of light always takes the place of
instantaneous action at a distance or of ac-
tion at a distance with an infinite velocity of
transmission. This is connected with the fact
2that the velocity c plays a fundamental role
in this theory.”6
The speed of light c plays a fundamental role vis-a`-vis
causality in SR because of the relativity of simultaneity.
For two events A and B with space-like separation (i.e.,
such that a signal connecting A and B would have to
propagate faster than c), the time ordering is ambiguous:
different inertial observers will disagree about whether A
precedes B in time, or vice versa. There is thus, accord-
ing to SR, no objective matter of fact about which event
occurs first – and hence no possibility of a causal relation
between them, since the relation between a cause and its
effect is necessarily time-asymmetric. As J.S. Bell put
this point, “To avoid causal chains going backward in
time in some frames of reference, we require them to go
slower than light in any frame of reference.”7
After the advent of SR, it didn’t take long for the
relativistic sense of local causality to be deployed in a
criticism of other developing theories, much as the pre-
relativistic concept had been used against Newton’s the-
ory. Indeed, it was Einstein himself – in both the fa-
mous, but widely misunderstood, EPR paper9 and sev-
eral related but less widely known arguments10 – who
first pointed out that the developing Copenhagen quan-
tum theory violated SR’s locality constraint. In particu-
lar, according to Einstein, that theory’s account of mea-
surement combined with Niels Bohr’s completeness doc-
trine committed the theory to precisely the sort of non-
local causation that was, at least according to Einstein,
prohibited by SR. Einstein thus rejected Bohr’s complete-
ness doctrine and supported (something like) what is now
(unfortunately11) called the local “hidden variables” pro-
gram.
Note the interesting parallel to Newtonian gravity
here, with the non-locality in some candidate theory be-
ing rendered either real or merely apparent, depending
on whether or not one interprets the theory as providing
a complete description of the physical processes in ques-
tion. Einstein’s assessment of Copenhagen quantum the-
ory with respect to local causality is thus logically parallel
to Newton’s analysis of his own theory of gravitation: the
theory, if regarded as complete, violates locality – hence
upholding locality requires denying completeness.
This brings us to the main subject of the present paper:
the work of J.S. Bell. Bell (unlike many commentators)
accepted Einstein’s proof of the non-locality of Copen-
hagen quantum theory. In particular, Bell accepted as
valid “the EPR argument from locality to deterministic
hidden variables.”14 The setup for this argument involves
a pair of specially-prepared particles which are allowed
to separate to remote locations. An observation of some
property of one particle then permits the observer to
learn something about a corresponding property of the
distant particle. According to the Copenhagen view, the
distant particle fails to possess a definite value for the
property in question prior to the observation, and so it
is precisely the observation of the nearby particle which
– in apparent violation of local causality – triggers the
crystallization of this newly real property for the distant
particle.
In Bell’s recapitulation of the argument, though, for
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) this
“simply showed that [Bohr, Heisenberg, and
Jordan] had been hasty in dismissing the re-
ality of the microscopic world. In particu-
lar, Jordan had been wrong in supposing that
nothing was real or fixed in that world be-
fore observation. For after observing only one
particle the result of subsequently observing
the other (possibly at a very remote place)
is immediately predictable. Could it be that
the first observation somehow fixes what was
unfixed, or makes real what was unreal, not
only for the near particle but also for the re-
mote one? For EPR that would be an un-
thinkable ‘spooky action at a distance’. To
avoid such action at a distance [one has] to
attribute, to the space-time regions in ques-
tion, real properties in advance of observa-
tion, correlated properties, which predeter-
mine the outcomes of these particular obser-
vations. Since these real properties, fixed in
advance of observation, are not contained in
quantum formalism, that formalism for EPR
is incomplete. It may be correct, as far as it
goes, but the usual quantum formalism can-
not be the whole story.”14
Bell thus agreed with Einstein that the local hidden vari-
ables program constituted the only hope for a locally
causal re-formulation of quantum theory.
Bell’s historic contribution, however, was a 1964 theo-
rem establishing that no such local hidden variable theory
– and hence no local theory of any kind – could gener-
ate the correct empirical predictions for a certain class
of experiment.15 According to Bell, we must therefore
accept the real existence, in nature, of faster-than-light
causation – in apparent conflict with the requirements of
SR:
“For me then this is the real problem with
quantum theory: the apparently essential
conflict between any sharp formulation and
fundamental relativity. That is to say, we
have an apparent incompatibility, at the
deepest level, between the two fundamental
pillars of contemporary theory...”16
Indeed, Bell even went so far as to suggest, in response to
his theorem and the relevant experimental data,17,18 the
rejection of “fundamental relativity” and the return to
a Lorentzian view in which there is a dynamically priv-
ileged (though probably empirically undetectable) refer-
ence frame:
“It may well be that a relativistic version
of [quantum] theory, while Lorentz invari-
ant and local at the observational level, may
3be necessarily non-local and with a preferred
frame (or aether) at the fundamental level.”12
And elsewhere:
“...I would say that the cheapest resolution
is something like going back to relativity
as it was before Einstein, when people like
Lorentz and Poincare´ thought that there was
an aether – a preferred frame of reference –
but that our measuring instruments were dis-
torted by motion in such a way that we could
not detect motion through the aether. Now,
in that way you can imagine that there is
a preferred frame of reference, and in this
preferred frame of reference things do go
faster than light. .... Behind the apparent
Lorentz invariance of the phenomena, there is
a deeper level which is not Lorentz invariant...
[This] pre-Einstein position of Lorentz and
Poincare´, Larmor and Fitzgerald, was per-
fectly coherent, and is not inconsistent with
relativity theory. The idea that there is an
aether, and these Fitzgerald contractions and
Larmor dilations occur, and that as a result
the instruments do not detect motion through
the aether – that is a perfectly coherent point
of view.”19,20
Here our intention is not to lobby for this radical view,
but simply to explain Bell’s rationale for contemplating
it.
This rationale involves a complex chain of reasoning
including at least these four steps: (i) arguing that SR
prohibits causal influences between space-like separated
events, (ii) constructing a mathematically precise formu-
lation of this prohibition, i.e., of relativistic local causal-
ity, (iii) deriving an empirically-testable inequality from
this formulation of local causality, and then (iv) estab-
lishing that the inequality is inconsistent with actual em-
pirical data. There is an extensive “Bell literature” in
which each of these steps is subjected to probing critical
analysis. The time-asymmetric character of causal rela-
tions – used in the argument for (i) that was sketched
above – has for example been challenged by Huw Price21
and, in a rather different way, by recent work of Roderich
Tumulka22 (which was, incidentally, based on earlier
work by Bell23). And there remain certain “loopholes”
in the experiments demonstrating violations of Bell’s in-
equality, such that one might conceivably doubt (iv).24
For the most part, though, physicists do not seriously
question (i) and regard (iv) as established with reason-
able conclusiveness. The controversies about the mean-
ing and implications of Bell’s theorem have thus centered
on points (ii) and (iii). Clearly, though, what one says
about point (iii) – the question of whether and how a
Bell-type inequality is entailed by local causality – will
depend strongly on whether and how one has addressed
(ii). And sadly, Bell’s own views in regard to (ii) have
been almost entirely invisible in the Bell literature. (The
review article cited in Ref. 24, for example, doesn’t ac-
knowledge Bell’s formulation of local causality at all but
instead proposes an alternative formulation very differ-
ent from Bell’s.) It is thus not terribly surprising that
so many commentators and textbook authors have sum-
marized the upshot of Bell’s theorem in ways so different
from Bell’s own. Typically, for example, one encounters
the claim that Bell’s inequality follows not from local
causality alone, but from the conjunction of local causal-
ity with some additional premises; some of the usual
suspects here include “hidden variables,” “determinism,”
“realism,” “counter-factual definiteness”, or an improper
insistence on a vaguely-defined “classical” way of think-
ing. One or more of these (rather than relativistic local
causality) is then invariably blamed for the inconsistency
with experiment.29–36
A full presentation of Bell’s alternative to these
widespread views would include a systematic treatment
of point (iii). We will sketch this derivation in Section VI,
but the bulk of our discussion will focus instead on Bell’s
formulation of local causality, i.e., his views on point (ii).
This discussion will be based primarily on (but will also
in several ways interpret and extend beyond) Bell’s 1990
paper “La nouvelle cuisine” (published in the same year
as his untimely death). Clearly explaining Bell’s for-
mulation of locality, however, will require also sketching
Bell’s interesting and refreshingly unorthodox views on
a number of related issues in the foundations of quan-
tum theory. The discussion will thus be elaborated and
supported with excerpts from Bell’s many other papers.
The main audience for the paper is students and physi-
cists with little or no prior knowledge of Bell’s theorem
beyond what they’ve read in textbooks. It should be un-
derstood, though, that virtually all of the issues raised
here are included because some kind of misunderstand-
ing (or simple ignorance) of them has been present and
influential in the Bell literature. We will provide occa-
sional citations to works which we think exemplify the
various important misunderstandings. But length con-
siderations (and the desire to keep this a self-contained,
positive presentation of Bell’s views) forbid any exten-
sive polemical discussions. Still, those familiar with the
Bell literature will have no trouble appreciating where
Bell’s own views challenge the conventional wisdom. It
is hoped that simply bringing Bell’s views more out into
the open will stimulate fruitful debates among those with
interests in these areas.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following sec-
tion, we jump quickly from some of Bell’s preliminary,
qualitative statements to his final, quantitative formula-
tion of relativistic local causality. Then, in Sections III-
V, we will highlight and explore various aspects by clari-
fying some perhaps-unfamiliar or suspicious terms which
appear in Bell’s formulation and by contrasting them to
various other ideas with which they have sometimes been
confused. Section VI will show how local causality (as
formulated by Bell) can be used to derive an empirically
testable Bell-type inequality, and also how it can be used
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FIG. 1: “Space-time location of causes and effects of events
in region 1.” (Figure and caption are from Ref. 7.)
to recapitulate the EPR argument. Finally, in Section
VII we will summarize the arguments presented and ac-
knowledge some limitations of and open questions about
Bell’s formulation.
II. LOCAL CAUSALITY: OVERVIEW
Let us begin with a qualitative formulation of Bell’s
concept of local causality. In a 1988 interview, in an-
swer to the question “What does locality mean?” Bell
responded:37
“It’s the idea that what you do has con-
sequences only nearby, and that any conse-
quences at a distant place will be weaker
and will arrive there only after the time per-
mitted by the velocity of light. Locality is
the idea that consequences propagate contin-
uously, that they don’t leap over distances.”38
Bell gave a slightly more careful (but still qualitative) for-
mulation of what he called the “Principle of local causal-
ity” in his 1990 paper:
“The direct causes (and effects) of events are
near by, and even the indirect causes (and
effects) are no further away than permitted
by the velocity of light.”7
Then, citing a figure which we have reproduced here as
Figure 1, Bell continues:
“Thus for events in a space-time region 1 ...
we would look for causes in the backward
light cone, and for effects in the future light
cone. In a region like 2, space-like separated
from 1, we would seek neither causes nor ef-
fects of events in 1.”7
This should be relatively uncontroversial. Bell immedi-
ately notes, however, that “[t]he above principle of lo-
cal causality is not yet sufficiently sharp and clean for
mathematics.”7
Here, then, is Bell’s sharpened and cleaned formulation
of special relativistic local causality. (The reader should
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FIG. 2: “Full specification of what happens in 3 makes events
in 2 irrelevant for predictions about 1 in a locally causal the-
ory.” (Figure and caption are from Ref. 7).
remember that this is, at this point, merely a ‘teaser’
which those to whom it is not already familiar should
only expect to understand after further reading.)
“A theory will be said to be locally causal
if the probabilities attached to values of local
beables in a space-time region 1 are unaltered
by specification of values of local beables in
a space-like separated region 2, when what
happens in the backward light cone of 1 is
already sufficiently specified, for example by
a full specification of local beables in a space-
time region 3...”7
The space-time regions referred to are illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. We may translate Bell’s formulation into mathe-
matical form as follows:
P (b1|B3, b2) = P (b1|B3), (1)
where bi refers to the value of some particular beable
in space-time region i and Bi refers to a sufficient (for
example, a complete) specification of all beables in the
relevant region. The P s here are the probabilities as-
signed to event b1 by the candidate theory in question.
Eq. (1) thus asserts mathematically just what Bell states
in the caption of his accompanying figure (reproduced
here as Figure 2): “full specification of [beables] in 3
makes events in 2 irrelevant for predictions about 1 in a
locally causal theory.”7
Let us then jump right in to a closer examination of
the several perhaps-puzzling features of this formulation.
III. BEABLES
For those to whom the term is new, the first question
about the word “beable” is: how to pronounce it? The
word has three syllables. It does not rhyme with “fee-
ble,” but with “agreeable.” Bell invented the word as a
contrast to the “observables” which play a fundamental
role in the formulation of orthodox quantum theory, so
let us begin there.
A. Beables vs. Observables
Beables (as contrasted to observables) are those ele-
ments of a theory which are supposed to correspond to
5something that is physically real, independent of any ob-
servation. Bell elaborates:
“The beables of the theory are those elements
which might correspond to elements of real-
ity, to things which exist. Their existence
does not depend on ‘observation’. Indeed ob-
servation and observers must be made out of
beables.”25
Or as he explains elsewhere,
“The concept of ‘observable’ .... is a rather
woolly concept. It is not easy to identify pre-
cisely which physical processes are to be given
the status of ‘observations’ and which are to
be relegated to the limbo between one obser-
vation and another. So it could be hoped that
some increase in precision might be possible
by concentration on the beables ... because
they are there.”26
Bell’s reservations here (about the concept “observable”
appearing in the fundamental formulation of allegedly
fundamental theories) are closely related to the so-called
“measurement problem” of orthodox quantum mechan-
ics, which Bell encapsulated by remarking that the ortho-
dox theory is “unprofessionally vague and ambiguous”25
in so far as its fundamental dynamics is expressed in
terms of “words which, however legitimate and neces-
sary in application, have no place in a formulation with
any pretension to physical precision” – such words as
“system, apparatus, environment, microscopic, macro-
scopic, reversible, irreversible, observable, information,
measurement.”27 As Bell elaborates,
“The concepts ‘system’, ‘apparatus’, ‘envi-
ronment’, immediately imply an artificial di-
vision of the world, and an intention to ne-
glect, or take only schematic account of, the
interaction across the split. The notions of
‘microscopic’ and ‘macroscopic’ defy precise
definition. So also do the notions of ‘re-
versible’ and ‘irreversible’. Einstein said that
it is theory which decides what is ‘observable’.
I think he was right – ‘observable’ is a com-
plicated and theory-laden business. Then the
notion should not appear in the formulation
of fundamental theory.”27
As Bell points out, even Bohr (a convenient personi-
fication of skepticism regarding the physical reality of
unobservable microscopic phenomena) recognizes certain
things (for example, the directly perceivable states of a
classical measuring apparatus) as unambiguously real,
i.e., as beables:
“The terminology, be-able as against observ -
able, is not designed to frighten with meta-
physic those dedicated to realphysic. It is
chosen rather to help in making explicit some
notions already implicit in, and basic to, or-
dinary quantum theory. For, in the words of
Bohr, ‘it is decisive to recognize that, how-
ever far the phenomena transcend the scope
of classical physical explanation, the account
of all evidence must be expressed in classical
terms.’ It is the ambition of the theory of
local beables to bring these ‘classical terms’
into the equations, and not relegate them en-
tirely to the surrounding talk.”26
The unprofessional vagueness and ambiguity of orthodox
quantum theory, then, is related to the fact that its for-
mulation presupposes these (classical, macroscopic) be-
ables, but fails to provide clear mathematical laws to
describe them. As Bell explains,
“The kinematics of the world, in [the] ortho-
dox picture, is given by a wavefunction ... for
the quantum part, and classical variables –
variables which have values – for the classi-
cal part... [with the classical variables being]
somehow macroscopic. This is not spelled
out very explicitly. The dynamics is not
very precisely formulated either. It includes
a Schro¨dinger equation for the quantum part,
and some sort of classical mechanics for the
classical part, and ‘collapse’ recipes for their
interaction.”27
There are thus two related problems. First, the posited
ontology is rather different on the two sides of (what Bell
calls) “the shifty split”27 – that is, the division between
“the quantum part” and “the classical part.” But then,
as a whole, the posited ontology remains unavoidably
vague so long as the split remains shifty – i.e., so long
as the dividing line between the macroscopic and micro-
scopic remains undefined. And second, the interaction
across the split is problematic. Not only is the account of
this dynamics (the “collapse” process) inherently bound
up in concepts from Bell’s list of dubious terms, but the
very existence of a special dynamics for the interaction
seems to imply inconsistencies with the dynamics already
posited for the two realms separately.
As Bell summarizes,
“I think there are professional problems [with
quantum mechanics]. That is to say, I’m a
professional theoretical physicist and I would
like to make a clean theory. And when I
look at quantum mechanics I see that it’s a
dirty theory. The formulations of quantum
mechanics that you find in the books involve
dividing the world into an observer and an
observed, and you are not told where that di-
vision comes... So you have a theory which is
fundamentally ambiguous...”19
The point of all this is to clarify the sort of theory Bell
had in mind as satisfying the relevant standards of pro-
fessionalism in physics. It is often thought, by those who
6do not understand or do not accept Bell’s criticisms of
orthodox quantum theory, that the very concept of “be-
able” (in terms of which his concept of local causality is
formulated) commits one already to hidden variables or
determinism or some sort of naive realism or some other
physically or philosophically dubious principle.
But this is not correct. The requirement here, ulti-
mately, is only that candidate fundamental theories – at
least, those “with any pretension to physical precision”27
– be formulated clearly and precisely. And this requires,
according to Bell, that the theories provide a uniform
and consistent candidate description of physical reality.
In particular, there should be no ambiguity or inconsis-
tency regarding what a given candidate theory is fun-
damentally about (the beables), nor regarding precisely
how those posited physically real elements are posited to
act and interact (the laws).
B. Beables vs. Conventions
So far we have explained the term “beable” by con-
trasting it to the “observables” of orthodox quantum the-
ory. We must now also contrast the concept of “beables”
with those elements of a theory which are, to some de-
gree, conventional:
“The word ‘beable’ will also be used here to
carry another distinction, that familiar al-
ready in classical theory between ‘physical’
and ‘non-physical’ quantities. In Maxwell’s
electromagnetic theory, for example, the
fields E andH are ‘physical’ (beables, we will
say) but the potentials A and φ are ‘non-
physical’. Because of gauge invariance the
same physical situation can be described by
very different potentials. It does not matter
[i.e., it is not a violation of local causality]
that in Coulomb gauge the scalar potential
propagates with infinite velocity. It is not re-
ally supposed to be there. It is just a mathe-
matical convenience.”26
Or, as Bell puts the same point in another paper,
“...there are things which do go faster than
light. British sovereignty is the classical ex-
ample. When the Queen dies in London (long
may it be delayed) the Prince of Wales, lec-
turing on modern architecture in Australia,
becomes instantaneously King.... And there
are things like that in physics. In Maxwell’s
theory, the electric and magnetic fields in free
space satisfy the wave equation
1
c2
∂2E
∂t2
−∇2E = 0
1
c2
∂2B
∂t2
−∇2B = 0
...corresponding to propagation with velocity
c. But the scalar potential, if one chooses to
work in ‘Coulomb gauge’, satisfies Laplace’s
equation
−∇2φ = 0
...corresponding to propagation with infinite
velocity. Because the potentials are only
mathematical conveniences, and arbitrary to
a high degree, made definite only by the im-
position of one convention or another, this
infinitely fast propagation of the Coulomb-
gauge scalar potential disturbs no one. Con-
ventions can propagate as fast as may be con-
venient. But then we must distinguish in our
theory between what is convention and what
is not.”7
Thus, in order to cleanly decide whether a given theory
is or is not consistent with local causality,
“you must identify in your theory ‘local
beables’. The beables of the theory are those
entities in it which are, at least tentatively, to
be taken seriously, as corresponding to some-
thing real. The concept of ‘reality’ is now an
embarrassing one for many physicists.... But
if you are unable to give some special sta-
tus to things like electric and magnetic fields
(in classical electromagnetism), as compared
with the vector and scalar potentials, and
British sovereignty, then we cannot begin a
serious discussion.”7
This explains why, according to Bell: “It is in terms of
local beables that we can hope to formulate some notion
of local causality.”26
C. Beables and Candidate Theories
It is important to appreciate that a beable is only a be-
able relative to some particular candidate theory which
posits those elements as physically real (and, presumably,
gives precise mathematical laws for their dynamics). For
example, the fields E and B (and not the potentials) are
beables according to classical Maxwellian electrodynam-
ics as it is normally understood. But one could imagine
some alternative theory which (perhaps motivated by the
Aharanov-Bohm effect) posits the Coulomb gauge poten-
tials as beables instead. Note that, although it would
be empirically and in some sense mathematically equiv-
alent to the usual theory, the alternative theory would
evidently violate local causality (because, say, wiggling a
charge would instantaneously affect the physically-real
scalar potential at distant locations) while the usual,
Maxwellian theory would respect it.
Thinking in terms of such candidate theories helps us
separate any questions about what the “real beables” are
7– what really exists out there in physical reality – into
two distinct parts: first, what elements does a given can-
didate theory posit as beables; and second, which candi-
date theory do we think is true? The point is, you don’t
have to be able to answer the second question in order
to answer (for a given theory) the first. This should pro-
vide some comfort to those who (perhaps influenced by
positivist or instrumentalist philosophy) think we can’t
(and/or shouldn’t try to) establish some theoretical pic-
ture of external reality as true. Such people may still
accept Bell’s characterization of when “a theory will be
said to be locally causal.”
But even those who are not skeptical on principle rec-
ognize that, because of the complexity in practice of set-
tling questions about the truth status of scientific theo-
ries, some tentativeness is often in order. Bell recognizes
this too:
“I use the term ‘beable’ rather than some
more committed term like ‘being’ or ‘beer’
to recall the essentially tentative nature of
any physical theory. Such a theory is at
best a candidate for the description of na-
ture. Terms like ‘being’, ‘beer’, ‘existent’,
etc., would seem to me lacking in humility.
In fact ‘beable’ is short for ‘maybe-able’.”25
The crucial point is that the “maybe” here pertains to
the epistemological status of a given candidate theory.
By contrast, the “beable status”26 of certain elements
of a theory relative to that theory should be completely
straightforward and uncontroversial. If there is any ques-
tion about what elements a theory posits as beables, it
can only be because the proponents of the theory have
not (yet) sufficiently clarified what the theory is about,
what the theory is. Whether the theory is true or false
is an orthogonal question.
All of that said, Bell does take certain elements largely
for granted as beables – that is, as beables that any se-
rious candidate theory would have to recognize as such:
“The beables must include the settings of switches and
knobs on experimental equipment, the currents in coils,
and the readings of instruments.”26 As noted before,
even Bohr acknowledges the real existence (the beable
status) of these sorts of things. And, as suggested by
Bohr, since our primary cognitive access to the world
is through “switches and knobs on experimental equip-
ment” and other such directly perceivable facts – i.e.,
since such facts must always constitute the primary ev-
idence on which we will have to rest any argument for
the truth of a particular candidate physical theory – it
is hard to imagine a serious theory which doesn’t grant
such facts beable status: a theory which didn’t would ev-
idently have to regard our perception as systematically
delusional, and hence would have to regard any alleged
empirical evidence – for anything, including itself – as
invalid. In short, such a theory would evidently be self-
refuting.39
We stress this point for two related reasons. First,
anyone who is uncomfortable with the apparently “meta-
physical” positing of ultimate “elements of reality” (even
in a tentative way, through the tentative positing of a
candidate physical theory) should be relieved to find that
the concept “beable” is merely a placeholder for what-
ever entities we (tentatively) include in the class which
already, by necessity, exists and includes certain basic,
directly-perceivable features of the world around us. And
second, these particular beables – e.g., the settings of
knobs and the positions of pointers – have a particularly
central role to play in the derivation (from Bell’s con-
cept of local causality) of the empirically testable Bell
inequalities. This will be developed in Section VI.
IV. COMPLETENESS
Having clarified the concept of “beables” which ap-
pears in Bell’s formulation of local causality, let us now
turn to the last phrase in that formulation, italicized
here:
“A theory will be said to be locally causal
if the probabilities attached to values of lo-
cal beables in a space-time region 1 are un-
altered by specification of values of local be-
ables in a space-like separated region 2, when
what happens in the backward light cone of 1
is already sufficiently specified, for example by
a full specification of local beables in a space-
time region 3...”7
In a word, the key assumption here is “that events in 3
be specified completely”7 (emphasis added).
Let us first see why this requirement is necessary. Con-
sider again Figure 2, and suppose that B¯3 denotes an in-
complete specification of beables in region 3. It can then
be seen that a violation of
P (b1|B¯3, b2) = P (b1|B¯3) (2)
does not entail the existence of any super-luminal causal
influences. For suppose some event “X” in the overlap-
ping backwards light cones of regions 1 and 2 causally
influences both b1 and b2. It might then be possible to
infer, from b2, something about X , from which one could
in turn infer something about b1. Suppose, though, that
the incomplete description of events in region 3 – B¯3 –
omits precisely the “traces” of this past common cause
X . Then b2 could usefully supplement B¯3 – i.e., Eq. (2)
could be violated – even in the presence of purely local
causation.
Thus, as Bell explains, in order for Eq. (1) to function
as a valid locality criterion,
“it is important that events in 3 be specified
completely. Otherwise the traces in region 2
of causes of events in 1 could well supplement
whatever else was being used for calculating
probabilities about 1. The hypothesis is that
8any such information about 2 becomes redun-
dant when 3 is specified completely.”7
And here is the same point from an earlier paper:
“Now my intuitive notion of local causality
is that events in 2 should not be ‘causes’ of
events in 1, and vice versa. But this does
not mean that the two sets of events should
be uncorrelated, for they could have common
causes in the overlap of their backward light
cones [in a local theory]. It is perfectly intel-
ligible then that if [B3] in [region 3] does not
contain a complete record of events in that
[region], it can be usefully supplemented by
information from region 2. So in general it
is expected that [P (b1|b2, B¯3) 6= P (b1|B¯3).]
However, in the particular case that [B3] con-
tains already a complete specification of be-
ables in [region 3], supplementary informa-
tion from region 2 could reasonably be ex-
pected to be redundant.”26
It is important to stress that, like the concept of beables
itself, the idea of a sufficient (full or complete) specifi-
cation of beables is relative to a given candidate theory.
What Bell’s local causality condition requires is that –
in order to assess the consistency between a given candi-
date theory and the relativistic causal structure sketched
in Figure 1 – we must include, in B3, everything that
candidate theory says is present (or relevant) in region 3.
It is not, by contrast, necessary that we achieve omni-
science regarding what actually exists in some spacetime
region.
The appearance of the word “completeness” tends to
remind commentators of the EPR argument, and hence
apparently also tends to suggest that Bell smuggled into
his definition of local causality the unwarranted assump-
tion that orthodox quantum theory is incomplete. (See,
for example, Ref. 44.) As mentioned earlier, Bell did ac-
cept the validity of the EPR argument. But this means
only that, according to Bell, local causality – plus some
of QM’s empirical predictions – entail the incompleteness
of orthodox QM. His view on that point, however, is no
part of his formulation of local causality. (See Section
VI for further discussion of the relation between local
causality and the EPR argument.)
What Bell’s formulation does say is only this: whatever
your theory posits as physically real (in region 3), make
sure you include all of that when calculating the rele-
vant probabilities to test whether your theory respects
or violates Eq. (1), i.e., whether your theory is or isn’t
locally causal in the sense of Figure 1. No assumptions
are made about the type of theory to which the locality
criterion can be applied. In particular, the incomplete-
ness of orthodox quantum theory (i.e., the existence of
“hidden variables”) is not assumed. The virtue of Bell’s
formulation lies precisely in this generality.
Although it is simplest to understand Bell’s local
causality condition as requiring a complete specification
of beables in some spacetime region, there is an impor-
tant reason why Bell explicitly leaves open the possibil-
ity that a specification of “what happens in the back-
ward light cone of 1” might be “sufficiently specified”
by something less than a complete specification of the
beables there. This has to do with the fact, to be dis-
cussed more in Section VI, that in order to derive an
empirically-testable Bell-type inequality from the local
causality condition, one needs a subsidiary assumption,
sometimes called “experimental freedom” or “no con-
spiracies”. This is in essence the assumption that, in
the usual EPR-Bell kind of scenario in which a central
source emits pairs of specially-prepared particles in oppo-
site directions toward two spatially-separated measuring
devices, it is possible for certain settings on the devices
(determining which of several possible measurements are
made on a given incoming particle) to be made “freely”
or “randomly” – that is, independently of the state of the
incident particle pair.
In the more recent versions of these experiments, the
relevant settings are made using independent (quan-
tum) random number generators.18 According to ortho-
dox QM, there is therefore nothing in the past light cone
of an individual measurement event foretelling which of
the possible measurements will be performed. But there
of course exist alternative candidate theories (such as the
de Broglie - Bohm pilot-wave theory, which is determin-
istic) according to which those same settings are influ-
enced by events in their pasts. But then, the relevant
pasts of the device settings necessarily overlap with the
pre-measurement states of the particles being measured.
A complete specification of beables in the relevant region
containing those pre-measurement states will therefore
inevitably include facts relevant to (if not determining)
the device settings. And so, in deriving the Bell inequal-
ity from local causality, there is a kind of subtle tension
between the requirement “that events in 3 be specified
completely”7 and the requirement that device settings
can be made independent of the states of the particles-
to-be-measured.
To resolve the tension, one need merely allow that the
beables in the relevant region can be divided up into dis-
joint classes: those which are influenced by the prepara-
tion procedure at the source (and which thus encode the
“state of the particle pair”) and those which are to be
used in the setting of measurement apparatus parame-
ters. And note that these two classes are likely to be far
from jointly exhaustive: in any plausible candidate the-
ory, there will have to exist many additional beables (cor-
responding, for example, to stray electromagnetic fields,
low energy relic neutrinos, etc.) which are in neither
of the mentioned classes. One thus expects a consider-
able “causal distance” between the two classes of beables
(at least in a well-designed experiment). This makes the
“freedom” or “no conspiracies” assumption – namely, the
absense of correlations between the two classes of beables
– quite reasonable to accept.
9This issue will be addressed in some more detail in Sec-
tion VI. For now, we simply acknowledge its existence as
a way of explaining why Bell’s formulation of local causal-
ity mentions “complete” descriptions of events in region
3 as merely an example of the kind of description which
is “sufficient”. One might summarize the discussion here
as follows: what is required for the validity of the local
causality condition is a complete specification of beables
in region 3 – but only those beables which are relevant
in some appropriate sense to the event b1 in question in
region 1.
V. CAUSALITY
Recall the transition from Bell’s preliminary, qualita-
tive formulation of local causality to the final, “sharp and
clean” version. And recall in particular Bell’s statement
that the preliminary version was insufficiently sharp and
clean for mathematics. What is it, exactly, that Bell con-
sidered inadequate about the qualitative statement? It
seems likely that it was the presence there of the terms
“cause” and “effect” which are notoriously difficult to de-
fine mathematically. Indeed, about his final formulation
Bell says: “Note, by the way, that our definition of locally
causal theories, although motivated by talk of ‘cause’ and
‘effect’, does not in the end explicitly involve these rather
vague notions.”7
How exactly does Bell’s “definition of locally causal
theories” fail to “explicitly involve” the “rather vague no-
tions” of cause and effect? On its face this sounds para-
doxical. But the resolution is simple: what Bell’s defini-
tion actually avoids is any specific commitment about
what physically exists and how it acts. (Indeed, any
such commitments would seriously restrict the general-
ity of the locality criterion, and hence undermine the
scope of Bell’s theorem.) Instead, Bell’s definition shifts
the burden of providing some definite account of causal
processes to theories and itself merely defines a space-
time constraint that must be met if the causal processes
posited by a candidate theory are to be deemed locally
causal in the sense of SR.
The important mediating role of candidate theories vis-
a`-vis causality will be further stressed and clarified in
the following subsection. Subsequent subsections further
clarify the concept of “causality” in Bell’s “local causal-
ity” by contrasting it with several other ideas with which
it has often been confused or conflated.
A. Causality and candidate theories
As already discussed, according to Bell it is the job
of physical theories to posit certain physically real struc-
tures (beables) and laws governing their interactions and
evolution. Thus Bell’s definition of locally causal the-
ories is not a specification of locality for a particular
type of theory, namely, those that are “causal” – with
the implication that there would exist also theories that
are “non-causal.” A theory, by the very nature of what
we mean by that term in this context, is automatically
causal. “Causal theory” is a redundancy. And so, as
noted earlier, one must understand Bell’s “definition of
locally causal theories” as a criterion that theories – i.e.,
candidate descriptions of causal processes in nature –
must satisfy in order to be in accord with special rela-
tivistic locality. In short, the causality in the “definition
of locally causal theories” is simply whatever a given can-
didate theory says, about whatever it says it about.
As Bell explains, the practical reason for defining lo-
cal causality in terms of the physical processes posited
by some candidate theory (as opposed to the physical
processes which actually exist in nature) has to do with
our relatively direct access to the one as opposed to the
other:
“I would insist here on the distinction be-
tween analyzing various physical theories, on
the one hand, and philosophising about the
unique real world on the other hand. In this
matter of causality it is a great inconvenience
that the real world is given to us once only.
We cannot know what would have happened
if something had been different. We cannot
repeat an experiment changing just one vari-
able; the hands of the clock will have moved,
and the moons of Jupiter. Physical theories
are more amenable in this respect. We can
calculate the consequences of changing free
elements in a theory, be they only initial con-
ditions, and so can explore the causal struc-
ture of the theory. I insist that [the theory
of local beables, i.e., the local causality con-
cept] is primarily an analysis of certain kinds
of physical theory.”28
Bell’s view, contra several commentators45,46, is thus
that no special philosophical account of causation is
needed to warrant the conclusion that violation of the lo-
cality condition implies genuine non-local causation. For
Bell, it is a rather trivial matter to decide, for some (un-
ambiguously formulated) candidate physical theory, what
is and is not a genuinely causal influence. We can simply
“explore the causal structure of” the candidate theory.
This of course raises the question of how we might go
from recognizing the non-locality of some particular can-
didate theory, to the claim that nature is non-local. But
this is just Bell’s theorem: all candidate theories which
respect the locality condition are inconsistent with ex-
periment. (See Section VI.) So the “one true theory”
(whatever that turns out to be!) – and hence nature
itself – must violate relativistic local causality.
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B. Causality vs. determinism
The previous subsection stressed that the “causal” in
“locally causal theories” simply refers to the physically
real existents and processes (beables and associated laws)
posited by some candidate theory, whatever exactly those
might be. We in no way restrict the class of theories
(whose locality can be assessed by Bell’s criterion) by in-
troducing “causality.” In particular, the word “causal” in
“locally causal theories” is not meant to imply or require
that theories be deterministic as opposed to irreducibly
stochastic.
“We would like to form some [notion] of local
causality in theories which are not determin-
istic, in which the correlations prescribed by
the theory, for the beables, are weaker.”26
Bell thus uses the word “causal” quite deliberately as a
wider abstraction which subsumes but does not necessar-
ily entail determinism.
This is manifested most clearly in the fact that Bell’s
mathematical formulation of “local causality” – Eq. (1)
– is stated in terms of probabilities. Indeed, in his 1976
paper “The Theory of Local Beables”26 Bell discusses
“Local Determinism” first, arguing that, in a “local de-
terministic” theory the actual values of beables in region
1 (of Figure 2) will be determined by a complete speci-
fication of beables in region 3 (with additional specifica-
tion of beables from region 2 being redundant). In our
mathematical notation, local determinism means
b1(B3, b2) = b1(B3) (3)
where, as before, b1 and b2 are the values of specific be-
ables in regions 1 and 2, while B3 denotes a sufficient
(e.g., complete) specification of beables in region 3.
In a (local) stochastic theory, however, even a complete
specification of relevant beables in the past (e.g., those
in region 3 of Figure 2) may not determine the realized
value of the beable in question (in region 1). Rather, the
theory specifies only probabilities for the various possible
values that might be realized for that beable. Of course,
determinism is not really an alternative to, but is rather
merely a special case of, stochasticity:
“Consider for example Maxwell’s equations,
in the source-free case for simplicity. The
fields E and B in region 1 are completely de-
termined by the fields in region 3, regardless
of those in 2. Thus this is a locally causal
theory in the present sense. The determinis-
tic case is a limit of the probabilistic case, the
probabilities becoming delta functions.”7
The natural generalization of the above mathematical
formulation of “local determinism” is precisely Bell’s lo-
cal causality condition:
P (b1|B3, b2) = P (b1|B3), (4)
i.e., b2 is irrelevant – not for determining what happens
in region 1 because that, in a stochastic theory, is simply
not determined – but rather for determining the prob-
ability for possible happenings in region 1. Such prob-
abilities are the “output” of stochastic theories in the
same sense that the actual realized values of beables are
the “output” of deterministic theories. Thus, Bell’s lo-
cal causality condition for stochastic theories – Eq. (4)
– and the analogous condition – Eq. (3) – for determin-
istic theories, are imposing precisely the same locality
requirement on the two kinds of theories: information
about region 2 should be irrelevant in regard to what the
theory says about region 1, once the beables in region 3
are sufficiently specified.
Of course, if one insists that any stochastic theory is
ipso facto a stand-in for some (perhaps unknown) under-
lying deterministic theory (with the probabilities in the
stochastic theory thus resulting not from indeterminism
in nature, but from our ignorance), Bell’s locality con-
cept would cease to work. The requirement of a complete
specification of beables in region 3 would then contradict
the allowance that such a specification does not neces-
sarily determine the events in region 1. But this is no
objection to Bell’s concept of local causality. Bell is not
asking us to accept that any particular theory (stochas-
tic or otherwise) is true; he’s just asking us to accept his
definition of what it would mean for a stochastic theory
to respect relativity’s prohibition on superluminal cau-
sation. And this requires us to accept, at least in prin-
ciple, that there could be such a thing as a genuinely,
irreducibly stochastic theory, and that the way “causal-
ity” appears in such a theory is that certain beables do,
and others do not, influence the probabilities for specific
events.
We have been stressing here that “causality” is wider
than, and does not necessarily entail, determinism. Bell
has deliberately and carefully formulated a local causal-
ity criterion that does not tacitly assume determinism,
and which is thus stated explicitly in terms of probabil-
ities – the fundamental, dynamical probabilities assigned
by stochastic theories to particular happenings in space-
time. Note in particular that the probabilities in Eq. (1)
are not subjective (in the sense of denoting the degree
of someone’s belief in a proposition about b1), they can-
not be understood as reflecting partial ignorance about
relevant beables in region 3, and they do not (primar-
ily) represent empirical frequencies for the appearance of
certain values of b1. They are, rather, the fundamental
“output” of some candidate (stochastic) physical theory.
C. Causality vs. correlation
Everyone knows that correlation doesn’t imply causal-
ity. Two events (say, the values taken on by beables b1
and b2 in Bell’s spacetime regions 1 and 2, respectively)
may be correlated without there necessarily being any
implication that b1 is the cause of b2 or vice versa:
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FIG. 3: Similar to Figure 2, except that region 3∗ (unlike re-
gion 3 of Figure 2) fails to shield off region 1 from the overlap-
ping backward light cones of regions 1 and 2. Thus, (following
the language of Figure 2’s caption) even full specification of
what happens in 3∗ does not make events in 2 irrelevant for
predictions about 1 in a locally causal theory.
“Of course, mere correlation between distant
events does not by itself imply action at a dis-
tance, but only correlation between the sig-
nals reaching the two places.”14
And Bell describes the issue motivating his 1990 paper
“La nouvelle cuisine” as “the problem of formulating ...
sharply in contemporary physical theory” “these notions,
of cause and effect on the one hand, and of correlation
on the other”.7
It is sometimes reported that Bell’s local causality con-
dition is really only a “no correlation” requirement, such
that the empirical violation of the resulting inequalities
establishes only “non-local correlations” (as opposed to
non-local causation). (See, e.g., Ref. 33.) But this is a
misconception. Bell uses the term “causality” (e.g., in
talking about his “definition of locally causal theories”)
to highlight that a violation of this condition (by some
theory) means that the theory posits non-local causal in-
fluences, as opposed to mere “non-local correlations.”
It will be clarifying to illustrate this by relaxing a point
that Bell has carefully built into his formulation of lo-
cal causality, and showing that violation of the resulting,
weakened condition may still entail correlations between
space-like separated events, but no longer implies that
there are faster-than-light causal influences. Actually,
we have done this once already, in the previous section,
when we explained why a violation of Eq. (2) would not
(unlike a violation of Eq. (1)) entail any violation of the
causal structure of Figure 1. We now consider a second
modified version of Bell’s criterion.
Consider again the spacetime diagram sketched in Fig-
ure 2. Bell notes that
“It is important that region 3 completely
shields off from 1 the overlap of the backward
light cones of 1 and 2.”7
Why is this so important? For example, why couldn’t
we replace region 3 of Figure 2 with a region like that
labelled 3∗ in Figure 3? This region, just like 3 in Fig-
ure 2, closes off the back light cone of 1 and hence – it
might seem – would be perfectly sufficient for defining the
probabilites associated with b1 in a locally causal theory.
But a more careful analysis shows that a violation of
P (b1|B3∗ , b2) = P (b1|B3∗) (5)
(the same as Eq. (1) but with region 3 of Figure 2 re-
placed by region 3∗ of Figure 3) does not entail any non-
local causation. Here, there is a perfectly local causal
mechanism by which b1 and b2 can be correlated, in a
way that isn’t “screened off” by conditionalization on
B3∗ , thus violating Eq. (5) in a situation which involves
no violation of relativistic local causation. The mecha-
nism is this: in a stochastic theory, an event may occur at
the space-time point labelled “X” in Figure 3 which was
not determined by the complete specification of beables
(B3∗) in region 3
∗. But despite not having been deter-
mined by beables in its past, that event really comes into
existence and may in principle have effects throughout its
future light cone – which includes both region 1 and re-
gion 2. Event X may, so to speak, broadcast sub-luminal
influences which bring about correlations between b1 and
b2, such that information about b2 is not redundant in
regard to defining what happens in region 1 (even after
conditionalizing on B3∗). Thus we may have a violation
of Eq. (5) – i.e., the candidate theory in question could
attribute different values to P (b1|B3∗ , b2) and P (b1|B3∗)
– despite there being, according to the theory in ques-
tion, no non-local causation at work. While Eq. (5) may
perhaps be described as some kind of “no correlations”
condition for regions 1 and 2, it definitely fails as a “no
causality” condition.
If we return, however, to the original region 3 (of Fig-
ure 2) which does “completely [shield] off from 1 the
overlap of the backward light cones of 1 and 2”7 it be-
comes clear that no such correlation-without-non-local-
causality can occur. Here, if some X-like event (not de-
termined by even a complete specification of beables in
region 3) occurs somewhere in the future light cone of re-
gion 3, it will necessarily fail to lie in the overlapping past
light cones of regions 1 and 2 (which would be necessary
for it to in turn locally influence both of those events).
Bell has carefully set things up so that a violation of
Eq. (1) entails that there is some non-local causation. It
isn’t necessarily that something in region 2 is causally
influencing something in region 1, or vice versa. It is
always possible that there is some other event, neither in
region 1 nor region 2, which was not determined by B3,
and which itself causally influences both b1 and b2. The
point is, though, that this causal influence would have
to be non-local (i.e., would have to violate the special
relativistic causal structure sketched in Figure 1).47
To summarize the point that a violation of Eq. (1)
entails non-local causation (rather than mere correlations
between space-like separated events) it is helpful to recall
Bell’s example of the correlation between the ringing of a
kitchen alarm and the readiness of a boiling egg. That the
alarm rings just as the egg is finished cooking obviously
does not entail or even suggest that the ringing caused
the egg to harden. Correlation does not imply causality.
As Bell completes the point,
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“The ringing of the alarm establishes the
readiness of the egg. But if it is already given
that the egg was nearly boiled a second be-
fore, then the ringing of the alarm makes the
readiness no more certain.”7
Reading b2 for “the ringing of the alarm,” b1 for “the
readiness of the egg,” and B3 for “the egg was nearly
boiled a second before,” we have a simple intuitive exam-
ple of Eq. (1): although b1 and b2 may be correlated such
that information about b2 can tell us something about b1,
that information will be redundant (in a locally causal
theory) once B3 is specified.
D. Causality vs. signaling
One final idea that is often confused with local causal-
ity is local (i.e., exclusively slower-than-light) signaling.40
Signaling is, of course, a certain human activity in which
one person transmits information, across some distance,
to another person. Such transmission clearly requires a
causal connection between the sending event and the re-
ceiving event, but it requires more as well: namely, the
ability of the people involved to send and receive the
information. That is, signaling requires some measure
of control (over appropriate beables) on the part of the
sender, and some measure of access (to appropriate be-
ables) on the part of the recipient.
The requirement that theories prohibit the possibility
of faster-than-light signaling – which incidentally is all
that is imposed in relativistic quantum field theory by the
requirement that field operators at spacelike separation
commute26 – is thus a much weaker condition than the
prohibition of faster-than-light causal influences. Theo-
ries can exhibit violations of relativistic local causality
and yet (because certain beables are inadequately con-
trollable by and/or inadequately accessible to humans)
preclude faster-than-light signals. Orthodox quantum
mechanics (including ordinary relativistic quantum field
theory) is one example of such a theory. Another exam-
ple is the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm, in
which
“...the consequences of events at one place
propagate to other places faster than light.
This happens in a way that we cannot use for
signaling. Nevertheless it is a gross violation
of relativistic causality.”16
One of the most prevalent mistakes made by commenta-
tors on Bell’s theorem is to conflate local causality with
local signaling.41 Often this takes the form of a kind of
double-standard in which alternatives to ordinary QM
are dismissed as “non-local” (and therefore unacceptable)
on the grounds that they include (either manifestly, as
in the case of the pilot-wave theory, or just in princi-
ple, as established by Bell’s theorem) “gross violations
of relativistic causality” – but then ordinary QM itself is
argued by comparison to be perfectly “local” (where now
only “local signaling” is meant or proved). Such reason-
ing, though, is obviously equivocal once one appreciates
that “local causality” and “local signaling” simply mean
different things.
Clearly differentiating these two notions does raise the
question of which, after all, SR should be understood to
prohibit. But the idea that the relativistic causal struc-
ture, sketched in Figure 1, should somehow apply ex-
clusively to this narrowly human activity, seems highly
dubious:
“...the ‘no signaling...’ notion rests on con-
cepts which are desperately vague, or vaguely
applicable. The assertion that ‘we cannot sig-
nal faster than light’ immediately provokes
the question:
Who do we think we are?
We who can make ‘measurements’, we who
can manipulate ‘external fields’, we who can
‘signal’ at all, even if not faster than light? Do
we include chemists, or only physicsts, plants,
or only animals, pocket calculators, or only
mainframe computers?”7
That is, the idea that SR is compatible with non-local
causal influences (but only prohibits non-local signaling)
seems afflicted by the same problem (reviewed in Sec-
tion III) that necessarily afflicts theories whose formu-
lations involve words like “observable”, “microscopic”,
“environment”, etc. In particular, the notion of “signal-
ing” seems somehow too superficial, too anthropocentric,
to adequately capture the causal structure of Figure 1.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF LOCAL CAUSALITY
Having reviewed Bell’s careful formulation of relativis-
tic local causality, let us now more briefly indicate some
of its important applications.
A. Factorization
In the typical EPR-Bell setup, we have separated
observers (traditionally Alice and Bob) making spin-
component measurements (using, say, Stern-Gerlach de-
vices oriented spatially along the aˆ and bˆ directions, re-
spectively) on each of a pair of spin-entangled particles.
The outcomes of their individual measurements (mani-
fested in the final location of the particle, or the position
of some pointer, or some fact about some other beable)
may be denoted by A and B respectively.
The beables pertaining to a given run of the experi-
ment may then be cataloged as in Figure 4. Roughly, we
may think of aˆ and bˆ (which live in regions 1 and 2, re-
spectively) as referring to the spatial orientations of the
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FIG. 4: Space-time diagram illustrating the various beables
of relevance for the EPR-Bell setup. (Cf. Bell’s diagram
in Ref. 7.) Separated observers Alice (in region 1) and Bob
(in region 2) make spin-component measurements (using ap-
paratus settings aˆ and bˆ respectively) on a pair of spin- or
polarization-entangled particles (represented by the dashed
lines). The measurements have outcomes A and B respec-
tively. The state of the particle pair in region 3 is denoted
λ. Note that what we are here calling region 3 extends across
the past light cones of both regions 1 and 2. It thus not only
“completely shields off from 1 the overlap of the backward
light cones of 1 and 2”7, but also vice versa. Bell’s local
causality condition therefore requires both that bˆ and B are
irrelevant for predictions about the outcome A, and that aˆ
and A are irrelevant for predictions about the outcome B,
once λ is specified.
two pieces of measuring apparatus (this being the basis
for the notation), and λ (in region 3) as referring to the
state of the particle pair emitted by the source. (Note
that the phrase “state of the particle pair” should not be
taken too seriously; no actual assumption is made about
the existence, for example, of literal particles.)
Unlike region 3 of Figure 2, region 3 of Figure 4 ex-
tends across the past light cone not only of region 1, but
of region 2 as well. It particular, this extended region
3 closes off the past light cones of both regions 1 and 2
and shields both regions from their overlapping past light
cones. A complete specification of beables in this region 3
will therefore, according to Bell’s concept of local causal-
ity, “make events in 2 irrelevant for predictions about 1”7
and will also make events in 1 irrelevant for predictions
about 2:
P (A|aˆ, bˆ, B, λ) = P (A|aˆ, λ) (6)
and
P (B|aˆ, bˆ, λ) = P (B|bˆ, λ). (7)
From these and the identity
P (A,B|aˆ, bˆ, λ) = P (A|aˆ, bˆ, B, λ) · P (B|aˆ, bˆ, λ) (8)
the so-called “factorization” of the joint probability for
outcomes A and B immediately follows:
P (A,B|aˆ, bˆ, λ) = P (A|aˆ, λ) · P (B|bˆ, λ). (9)
This factorization condition is widely recognized in the
Bell literature to be sufficient for the derivation of
empirically-testable Bell-type inequalities. As Bell notes,
however,
“Very often such factorizability is taken as
the starting point of the analysis. Here we
have preferred to see it not as the formula-
tion of ‘local causality’, but as a consequence
thereof.”7
B. The EPR Argument
In their famous 1935 paper, Einstein, Podolsky and
Rosen argued that a local explanation for the perfect cor-
relations predicted by quantum theory (in a certain kind
of situation of which the above EPR-Bell setup is an ex-
ample) required the existence of locally pre-determined
values for the measurement outcomes.9 Since, as men-
tioned in the introduction, ordinary QM contains no such
elements of reality, EPR concluded that ordinary QM
(and in particular the wave function) did not provide a
complete description of physical reality. They suggested
that an alternative, locally causal theory which did pro-
vide a complete description of physical reality might be
found.
Taking for granted that the relevant empirical predic-
tions of quantum theory are correct, one can summarize
the logic of EPR’s argument this way:
locality→ incompleteness (10)
where “incompleteness” means specifically the incom-
pleteness of the orthodox quantum mechanical descrip-
tion of the particles in question (in terms of their quan-
tum state alone). This is of course logically equivalent to
the statement that
completeness→ non-locality (11)
which explains why the EPR argument is sometimes
characterized as an argument for the incompleteness of
orthodox QM, and sometimes instead as pointing out the
non-locality of that candidate theory.
In their 1935 paper, EPR appealed to an intuitive no-
tion of local causality which was not precisely formulated.
It is therefore of interest that their argument can be reca-
pitulated and made rigorous by using Bell’s formulation
of local causality. It is clarifying to begin with the EPR
argument in the form of Statement 11. The proof then
consists in simply using the formulated notion of local
causality in its directly-intended way – namely, to assess
whether a particular candidate theory is or is not local.
Take again the situation indicated in Figure 4. Here it
is important to appreciate that because of the structure
of region 3 – and note that it could be extended into a
space-like hypersurface crossing through the region 3 de-
picted there, and still satisfy the requirements discussed
earlier – the relevant complete specification of beables
does not presuppose that the “state of the particle pair”
itself must “factorize” into two distinct and independent
states for the two particles. The state can instead be
characterized in a way that is essentially inseparable, as
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in ordinary QM, and the argument still goes through: “It
is notable that in this argument nothing is said about the
locality, or even localizability, of the variable λ. These
variables could well include, for example, quantum me-
chanical state vectors, which have no particular localiza-
tion in ordinary space-time. It is assumed only that the
outputs A and B, and the particular inputs a and b, are
well localized.”14 Let us suppose in particular that the
“preparation procedure” at the particle source (the star
in Figure 4) gives rise to a pair in (what ordinary QM
describes as) the spin singlet state
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(| ↑〉1| ↓〉2 − | ↓〉1| ↑〉2) (12)
where | ↑〉1 means that particle 1 is spin-up along (say)
the z-direction, etc.
Suppose also that aˆ = bˆ = zˆ, i.e., both Alice and Bob
(freely) choose to measure the spins of the incoming par-
ticles along the z-direction. Then QM predicts (letting
A = +1 denote the result that Alice finds her particle to
be spin up, etc.) that either A = +1 and B = −1 (with
probability 50%) or that A = −1 and B = +1 (with
probability 50%).
Thus, noting that for orthodox QM λ in Figure 4 is
simply the quantum mechanical wave function, we have
for example that
P (A = +1|aˆ, λ) = 1
2
, (13)
but also that
P (A = +1|aˆ, bˆ, λ, B = −1) = 1, (14)
in violation of Eq. (1). Orthodox QM is not a locally
causal theory:
“The theory requires a perfect correlation of
[results] on the two sides. So specification of
the result on one side permits a 100% confi-
dent prediction of the previously totally un-
certain result on the other side. Now in ordi-
nary quantum mechanics there just is noth-
ing but the wavefunction for calculating prob-
abilities. There is then no question of mak-
ing the result on one side redundant on the
other by more fully specifying events in some
space-time region 3. We have a violation of
local causality.”7
As pointed out, Statements 10 and 11 are logically
equivalent, so it is clear that a locally causal explanation
for the perfect correlations predicted by QM will require
a theory with more (or perhaps just different) beables
than just the quantum mechanical wave function. But it
is possible to show directly from Bell’s concept of local
causality that one must in particular posit beables which
pre-determine the outcomes of both measurements.
To begin with, let us drop the assumption (which ap-
plied to ordinary QM) that it is possible to fully control
the state λ produced by the preparation procedure at
the source. Instead, we allow that λ may perhaps take
several distinct values from one run of the experiment to
another. Let us also continue to assume that Alice and
Bob both freely choose to make measurements along the
zˆ direction.
The argument is then simple: we have already shown
that local causality entails the factorization of the joint
probability for outcomes A,B, once λ is specified. Con-
sidering for example the case A = +1, B = +1, whose
joint probability vanishes, we therefore have that, for
each specific value of λ that might (with nonzero prob-
ability) be produced by the preparation procedure, one
of P (A = +1|aˆ, λ) and P (B = +1|bˆ, λ) must vanish.
But since there are only two possible outcomes for each
measurement, each of these possibilities entails that the
opposite outcome is pre-determined. For example,
P (A = +1|aˆ, λ) = 0 → P (A = −1|aˆ, λ) = 1 (15)
which means that those particular values of λ to which
this applies must “contain” or “encode” the outcome
A = −1 which will then be revealed with certainty if a
measurement along aˆ is performed. It is easy to see that
the possible values of λ must therefore fall into two mu-
tually exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories – those
which encode the pre-determined outcomes A = +1 and
B = −1, and those which encode the pre-determined
outcomes A = −1 and B = +1.42
Indeed, since the measurement axis is assumed to be
“free” the same argument will establish that λ must en-
code pre-determined outcomes for all possible measure-
ment directions. One thus sees how theories of deter-
ministic hidden variables (or what N. David Mermin has
dubbed “instruction sets”48) are in fact required by local
causality.
C. CHSH Inequality
It is well-known that a Bell-type inequality follows
from the assumption of local deterministic hidden vari-
ables or “instruction sets”. That theories of this type are
actually required by locality (as explained in the previous
sub-section) should therefore already clarify the serious-
ness with which Bell took the idea of a fundamental con-
flict between SR and the predictions of QM. This conflict
can, however, be brought out in an even more streamlined
way, by deriving a Bell-type inequality directly from the
factorization of the joint probability as in Eq. (9) – and
hence from Bell’s local causality (without any additional
discussion of determinism or pre-determined values).
Assume that the measurement scenario indicated in
Figure 4 is repeated many times, with each setting being
selected “freely” or “randomly” on each run, from two
possibilities: aˆ ∈ {aˆ1, aˆ2}, bˆ ∈ {bˆ1, bˆ2}. The procedure
which prepares or creates the “particles to be measured”
is held fixed for all runs of the experiment. As before, this
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will not necessarily imply that λ is constant for all runs,
since the relevant beables may be less than fully control-
lable; we will assume, though, that the distribution of
different values of λ across the runs can be characterized
by a probability distribution ρ(λ).
Next we define the correlation of outcomes A and B
as the expected value of their product:
C(aˆ, bˆ) =
∫ ∑
A,B
AB P (A|aˆ, λ)P (B|bˆ, λ) ρ(λ) dλ
=
∫
A¯(aˆ, λ) B¯(aˆ, λ) ρ(λ) dλ (16)
where
A¯(aˆ, λ) = P (A = +1|aˆ, λ)− P (A = −1|aˆ, λ) (17)
satisfies |A¯| ≤ 1, and similarly for B¯.
Now we consider several combinations of correlations
involving different pairs of settings. To begin with,
C(aˆ1, bˆ1)± C(aˆ1, bˆ2)
=
∫
A¯(aˆ1, λ)
(
B¯(bˆ1, λ)± B¯(bˆ2, λ)
)
ρ(λ) dλ (18)
so that ∣∣∣C(aˆ1, bˆ1)± C(aˆ1, bˆ2)
∣∣∣
≤
∫ ∣∣∣B¯(bˆ1, λ)± B¯(bˆ2, λ)
∣∣∣ ρ(λ) dλ. (19)
Similarly, we have that∣∣∣C(aˆ2, bˆ1)∓ C(aˆ2, bˆ2)
∣∣∣
≤
∫ ∣∣∣B¯(bˆ1, λ)∓ B¯(bˆ2, λ)
∣∣∣ ρ(λ) dλ. (20)
Adding Equations (19) and (20), and noting that |x ±
y|+ |x∓ y| is one of 2x, −2x, 2y, or −2y, we have that
∣∣∣C(aˆ1, bˆ1)± C(aˆ1, bˆ2)
∣∣∣+
∣∣∣C(aˆ2, bˆ1)∓ C(aˆ2, bˆ2)
∣∣∣
≤ 2 (21)
which is the so-called Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt
(CHSH) inequality.44 This is in essence the relation tested
in the experiments, e.g., Refs. 17 and 18. Quantum the-
ory predicts that (for appropriate preparations of the
two-particle state and for appropriate choices of aˆ1, aˆ2,
bˆ1, and bˆ2) the left hand side should be 2
√
2 – more than
40% larger than the constraint implied by local causality.
And the experimental results are in excellent agreement
with the quantum predictions.
Since the inequality is derived from the local causal-
ity condition, what follows from the experimental results
is that any theory which makes empirically correct pre-
dictions will have to violate the local causality condition.
As Bell writes, “The obvious definition of ‘local causality’
does not work in quantum mechanics, and this cannot be
attributed to the ‘incompleteness’ of that theory.”7
D. The “Free Variables” Assumption
Let us finally return to the assumption that the set-
tings aˆ and bˆ are “free” or “random”. Mathematically
speaking, this was the assumption that the probability
distribution ρ(λ) for the distribution of possible “states
of the particle pair” created by the source is independent
of the apparatus settings aˆ and bˆ. For example, in de-
riving Eq. (18) one assumes that the same probability
distribution ρ(λ) characterizes runs in which aˆ1 and bˆ1
are measured, as characterizes runs in which aˆ1 and bˆ2
are measured. As Bell writes in support of this assump-
tion,
“we may imagine the experiment done on
such a scale, with the two sides of the exper-
iment separated by a distance of order light
minutes, that we can imagine these settings
being freely chosen at the last second by two
different experimental physicists.... If these
last second choices are truly free ..., they are
not influenced by the variables λ. Then the
resultant values for [aˆ] and [bˆ] do not give any
information about λ. So the probability dis-
tribution over λ does not depend on [aˆ] or
[bˆ]...”7
The real (as opposed to imagined) experiments, however,
do not involve “settings being freely chosen at the last
second by two different experimental physicists” but in-
stead involve physical random (or pseudo-random) num-
ber generators. As mentioned earlier, though, this means
that – at least in principle, for some possible candidate
theories – a complete description of beables in region 3
of Figure 4 will include not only a complete description
of the “state of the particle pair” but also a complete
description of whatever physical degrees of freedom are
determining or influencing the eventual settings aˆ and bˆ –
making it not only possible but rather likely that the can-
didate theory in question should exhibit (contrary to the
assumption that was made) correlations between what
we have called λ and those settings.
As suggested earlier, though, one can here appeal to
the expectation that serious candidate theories will posit
an enormously large number of physical degrees of free-
dom in a spacetime region like 3, only some tiny fraction
of which are actually needed to completely specify the
“state of the particle pair” – i.e., the beables which are
physically influenced by the preparation procedure at the
source. There are then innumerable other beables in re-
gion 3 which might be used to determine/influence the
apparatus settings. The expectation – more precisely,
in the context of the derivation of the locality inequal-
ity, the assumption – is that this is done in some way
such that there are no correlations, no conspiratorial pre-
established harmonies, between the beables chosen to de-
termine the apparatus settings and those which encode
the “state of the particle pair”.
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As Bell acknowledges, therefore, one logical possibil-
ity (in the face of the empirical violations of the CHSH
inequality) is that
“it is not permissible to regard the experi-
mental settings [aˆ] and [bˆ] in the analyzers as
independent of the supplementary variables
λ, in that [aˆ] and [bˆ] could be changed without
changing the probability distribution ρ(λ).
Now even if we have arranged that [aˆ] and
[bˆ] are generated by apparently random ra-
dioactive devices, housed in separated boxes
and thickly shielded, or by Swiss national lot-
tery machines, or by elaborate computer pro-
grammes, or by apparently free willed experi-
mental physicists, or by some combination of
all of these, we cannot be sure that [aˆ] and [bˆ]
are not significantly influenced by the same
factors λ that influence A and B. But this
way of arranging quantum mechanical cor-
relations would be even more mind boggling
than one in which causal chains go faster than
light. Apparently separate parts of the world
would be deeply and conspiratorially entan-
gled, and our apparent free will would be en-
tangled with them.”14
And here is another relevant statement from Bell:
“An essential element in the reasoning here
is that [aˆ] and [bˆ] are free variables. One can
envisage then theories in which there just are
no free variables for the polarizer angles to be
coupled to. In such ‘superdeterministic’ the-
ories the apparent free will of experimenters,
and any other apparent randomness, would
be illusory. Perhaps such a theory could be
both locally causal and in agreement with
quantum mechanical predictions. However I
do not expect to see a serious theory of this
kind. I would expect a serious theory to per-
mit ‘deterministic chaos’ or ‘pseudorandom-
ness’, for complicated subsystems (e.g. com-
puters) which would provide variables suffi-
ciently free for the purpose at hand. But I do
not have a theorem about that.”7
It is sometimes erroneously thought that the “freedom”
or “no conspiracies” assumption being discussed here
does – or should – follow from local causality. For exam-
ple, in their illuminating “Exchange [with Bell] on Local
Beables” A. Shimony, M.A. Horne, and J.F. Clauser crit-
icized Bell’s derivation for using (in our notation) the as-
sumption ρ(λ|aˆ, bˆ) = ρ(λ) which, they correctly pointed
out, does not follow from local causality. Bell subse-
quently clarified that it was a separate assumption, not
supposed to follow from local causality. As Shimony,
Horne, and Clauser noted, however, the additional as-
sumption seems eminently reasonable:
“we feel that it is wrong on methodological
grounds to worry seriously about [the pos-
sibility of the kind of conspiracy that would
render the assumption inapplicable] if no spe-
cific causal linkage [between the beables λ
and those which determine the apparatus set-
tings] is proposed. In any scientific experi-
ment in which two or more variables are sup-
posed to be randomly selected, one can al-
ways conjecture that some factor in the over-
lap of the backward light cones has controlled
the presumably random choices. But, we
maintain, skepticism of this sort will essen-
tially dismiss all results of scientific experi-
mentation. Unless we proceed under the as-
sumption that hidden conspiracies of this sort
do not occur, we have abandoned in advance
the whole enterprise of discovering the laws
of nature by experimentation.”43
Imagine, for example, an experimental drug trial in which
patients are randomly selected to receive either the drug
or a placebo. It is always logically possible that the sup-
posedly random selections (made, say, by flipping a coin)
are in fact correlated with some pre-existing facts about
the health of patients. And such a correlation could skew
the results of the trial – say, resulting in a statistically sig-
nificant improvement in the health of the patients given
the genuine drug even though in fact the drug is impotent
or worse. The suggestion is that, in general, unless there
is some plausible causal mechanism that might conceiv-
ably produce the correlations in question (for example,
instead of flipping coins, the drug/placebo assignments
are made on the basis of patients’ blood pressures) it is
reasonable to assume that the conspiratorial correlations
are absent.
That is, the additional assumption (beyond local
causality) which is needed to derive the CHSH inequal-
ity “is no stronger than one needs for experimental rea-
soning generically”.43 The “no conspiracies” assumption
thus falls into the same category as some other things
(for example, the validity of logic, and certain mathe-
matical operations) which, while used in the derivation,
are not on the table as seriously challengeable. This ex-
plains why we sometimes do not even bother to mention
this assumption – as, for example, when writing that
the CHSH inequality follows from Bell’s concept of local
causality alone.
VII. SUMMARY AND OPEN QUESTIONS
We have reviewed J.S. Bell’s formulation of relativis-
tic local causality, including a careful survey of its con-
ceptual background and a sketch of its most important
implications. We have stressed in particular that Bell’s
formulation does not presuppose determinism or the ex-
istence of hidden variables (or any of the other sorts of
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things that are sometimes blamed for the empirical vio-
lation of Bell-type inequalities) but instead seems plau-
sibly to just capture the intuitive idea, widely taken as
an implication of special relativity, indicated in Figure
1 – namely, the idea that causal influences cannot prop-
agate faster than light. And as we have seen, taking
now the “no conspiracies” assumption for granted, the
empirically-violated CHSH inequality can be cleanly de-
rived from Bell’s concept of local causality without the
need for further assumptions involving determinism, hid-
den variables, “realism” or “classicality” (whatever ex-
actly those ideas mean), etc.
This hopefully clarifies why Bell disagreed with the
widespread opinion that his theorem – and the associ-
ated experiments – somehow vindicate ordinary quan-
tum theory as against hidden variable alternative theo-
ries or somehow vindicate Bohr’s philosophy as against
Einstein’s. Instead, the reader can now appreciate why,
for Bell, “the real problem with quantum theory” is the
“apparently essential conflict between any sharp formu-
lation and relativity [, i.e., the] apparent incompatibility,
at the deepest level, between the two fundamental pillars
of contemporary theory...”16
It should be noted, however, that the presentation here
has been of J.S. Bell’s formulation of relativistic local
causality. Although we have argued strongly for its rea-
sonableness, this particular formulation should not nec-
essarily be regarded as definitive.
Here we briefly indicate several points on which its ap-
plicability to various sorts of “exotic” theories could be
questioned and where a more general or distinct formu-
lation of local causality might be sought.
For example, one might worry that a theory with
a non-Markovian character (that is, a theory in which
causal influences can jump discontinuously from one time
to a later time) could violate Bell’s local causality con-
dition despite positing no strictly faster-than-light influ-
ences. The idea would be that, in such a theory, influ-
ences could “hop over” region 3 of Figure 2, leading to
correlations in regions 1 and 2 but leaving no trace in
3. This could seemingly be addressed by requiring that
Bell’s region 3 extend farther back in time, i.e., cover a re-
gion of spacetime so “thick” that hopping non-Markovian
influences cannot make it across. In the limit of arbitrar-
ily large violations of Markovianity, this would evidently
require region 3 to encompass the entire past light cone
of the region 3 pictured in Figure 2. But this maneuvre
raises further issues: the more of spacetime that gets in-
cluded in region 3, the more one might start to doubt
the reasonableness of the “no conspiracies” assumption,
and the more one might worry that the condition would
fail to detect certain kinds of non-localities (and so would
function merely as a necessary condition for, rather than
a formulation of, locality).
Similar problems arise when one contemplates the pos-
sibility of theories which posit not only local beables
(i.e., those “being associated with definite positions in
space”25) but also non-local beables. The de Broglie -
Bohm pilot-wave theory is probably the clearest example
here: its posited ontology includes both particles (which
follow definite trajectories in 3-space and are pre-eminent
examples of local beables) and a guiding wave (which is
simply the usual quantum mechanical wave function but
interpreted unambiguously as a beable). But, for an N -
particle system (the universe, say) the wave function is a
function on the 3N -dimensional configuration space. It
is thus, for this theory, a non-local beable.49
As mentioned previously, Bell’s region 3 can be ex-
tended into a space-like hypersurface without spoiling
any of the arguments that have been given in this pa-
per. We may then generously include, where Bell’s for-
mulation instructs us to use a complete specification of
the local beables in region 3, also values for any non-
local beables which, like wave functions, can be associ-
ated with hypersurfaces. And it is important that, even
when including information about non-local beables in
this way, such theories still violate the condition, i.e., are
diagnosable as non-local. Still, as formulated, Bell’s no-
tion of local causality seems to presuppose that we are
dealing with theories positing exclusively local beables.50
It can be stretched to accomodate certain extant theo-
ries which posit also non-local beables, but how to do
this with complete generality, and what other issues (like
those encountered above in the case of non-Markovian
theories) may arise in the attempt, remains unclear. On
the other hand, it is also unclear how seriously one can
or should take theories with non-local beables in the first
place. In particular: should such theories even be consid-
ered candidates for “locally causal” status? And perhaps
more importantly, could a theory positing non-local be-
ables possibly count as genuinely consistent with special
relativity?
Such questions will certainly not be answered here. We
raise them simply to give the reader some sense of the
concerns that one might have about Bell’s formulation of
local causality. Their admittedly exotic character should
however help explain why Bell felt driven to contemplate
“unspeakable” deviations from conventional wisdom. In
particular, one can now appreciate how simple everything
would become if we simply dropped the insistence on rec-
onciling the Bell experiments with “fundamental relativ-
ity” and instead returned to the (empirically equivalent)
pre-Einstein view according to which there exists a (hid-
den) preferred frame of reference. As explained by Bell
in the quotes given in the Introduction, such a view can
easily accomodate faster-than-light causal influences in a
way that Einsteinian relativity, seemingly, can’t.
Again, though, our goal here is not to lobby for this
view, but merely to explain Bell’s rationale for taking
it seriously, as a possibility warranting careful attention
– not just by philosophers and commentators, but by
physicists interested in addressing the puzzles of yester-
day, today, and tomorrow.
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